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A B S T R A C TThe preceding articles in this volume have identiﬁed and discussed a
wide range of methodological and practical issues in the develop-
ment of personalized medicine. This concluding article uses the
resulting insights to identify implications for the economic incen-
tives for evidence generation. It argues that promoting an efﬁcient
path to personalized medicine is going to require appropriate
incentives for evidence generation including: 1) a greater willingness
on the part of payers to accept prices that reﬂect value; 2) consid-
eration of some form of intellectual property protection (e.g., data
exclusivity) for diagnostics to incentivize generation of evidence of
clinical utility; 3) realistic expectations around the standards for
evidence; and 4) public investment in evidence collection to comple-
ment the efforts of payers and manufacturers. It concludes that suchsee front matter Copyright & 2013, International S
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ndence to: Adrian Towse, Ofﬁce of Health Economicincentives could build and maintain a balance among: 1) realistic
thresholds for evidence and the need for payers to have conﬁdence
in the clinical utility of the drugs and tests they use; 2) payment for
value, with prices that ensure cost-effectiveness for health systems;
and 3) levels of intellectual property protection for evidence gener-
ation that provide a return for those ﬁnancing research and develop-
ment, while encouraging competition to produce both better and
more efﬁcient tests.
Keywords: economic incentives, personalized medicine, pharma-
cogenetics, stratiﬁed medicine.
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The preceding articles in this volume have identiﬁed and dis-
cussed a wide range of methodological and practical issues in the
development of personalized medicine. As O’Donnell [1] points
out in the introduction, they cover three broad topic areas:
comparative effectiveness research, drug development, and eco-
nomic evaluation. In this concluding article, we attempt—from
an economic perspective—to identify the insights and impli-
cations for the crosscutting theme of economic incentives for
evidence generation.Deﬁnitional Issues
We follow Redekop and Mladsi [2] in using the term personalized
medicine (PM) in this article, while recognizing that this typically
involves stratifying patients into subpopulations and that we are
not just using genetic information to “prevent, diagnose and
treat.” As O’Donnell notes, it is important to avoid “second-order
discourse” from distracting us from the “pressing issues at hand”
[1]. As Redekop and Mladsi note, most economists would be quick
to point out that all medical treatments should be personalized in
the sense that the physician (the agent) should advise the patient
(the principal) taking into account patient preferences, the
evidence base that supports the likely beneﬁts and risks ofdifferent treatment choices, and the cost to the payer and to
the patient. The important difference in PM is the use of a
biomarker-based diagnostic test [3] to further deﬁne and identify
a subgroup of patients for whom the treatment performs better—
in terms of either cost-effectiveness or beneﬁt-risk balance. Thus,
we restrict our use of the term PM to refer to this biomarker-
based stratiﬁcation.The Progress of PM
We share the view of O’Donnell that “there remains a general
sense of dissatisfaction about the progress of personalized
medicine” [1]. It is not hard to understand how the excessive
optimism—even hype—of a decade ago has led to some cynical
views about the possibility of realizing the promise that PM holds
for the future. In the year 2000, Francis Collins, the current head
of the U.S. National Institutes of Health said, “In the next ﬁve to
seven years, we should identify the genetic susceptibility factors
for virtually all common diseases—cancer, diabetes, heart dis-
ease, the major mental illnesses—on down that list” [4]. Clearly,
this has not happened.
In 2005, a multidisciplinary exercise at the University of
Washington—including geneticists, physicians, pharmacists,
and economists—reached a less sanguine view about the speedociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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scenario for the year 2015, they predicted:
By 2015, approximately 10 years from now, a variety of test
kits using various biological markers testing will be feasible
when rapid test results are needed. Yet, the discovery and
validation of pharmacogenomic associations will likely con-
tinue at a similar measured pace. A notable development will
be the identiﬁcation of clinically useful pharmacogenomic
associations in drug development trials outside of oncology.
We expect that 10 to 15 pharmacogenomic tests will be in
routine use in clinical practice. Although the majority will
continue to be in oncology, evaluating both tumor and patient
genetics, several tests outside of oncology will be used by
primary care clinicians to guide treatment decisions. [5]
This prediction is arguably still on target. It is clear that
several genetic tests are widely used, mainly in oncology [6];
however, the total number in routine clinical use remains fairly
limited. The articles here have mentioned a number of examples
outside of oncology, including CYP2C19 testing for clopidogrel
and HLA-B*5701 testing for abacavir. In relation to drug develop-
ment also, the picture is mixed. Trastuzumab (Herceptin, Roche)
for HER2þ breast cancer has often been cited as the “poster child”
of PM. Despite the HER2 target receptor being identiﬁed in the
mid-1980s, it was not until 1998 that it was ﬁrst approved by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration for HER2þ metastatic breast
cancer, and for HER2þ early breast cancer in 2006. Its impact is
still evolving, with evidence of a synergistic effect with pertuzu-
mab, which acts on the HER3 receptor.
At the other end of the speed-of-development spectrum,
however, two highly signiﬁcant clinical improvements—cures or
near cures for some patients—were developed and adopted very
quickly: imatinib (Gleevec, Novartis) for Philadelphia chromosome-
positive (Phþ) chronic myelogenous leukemia and crizotinib
(Xalkori, Pﬁzer) for a small targeted group of non–small cell lung
cancer patients with anaplastic lymphoma kinase (ALK)
mutations.
The scientiﬁc challenges are therefore being met in some
cases but clearly remain. They are accompanied by a related set
of challenges in terms of evidence, economic evaluation, reim-
bursement, and regulation. The articles in this volume have
touched on all of these. We would like to reiterate and highlight
some of these points, placing particular emphasis on how each of
these challenges affects or is affected by economic incentives.Economic Evaluation Challenges and the Value to a Patient of
Knowing
In general, the methods of economic evaluation in PM are no
different than standard cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). Besides
health gain and cost-offsets captured in the usual CEA for a
typical patient, however, we can identify at least three other
ways in which PM might create additional value: 1) reducing the
patient’s uncertainty about the likelihood of successful treatment
—the “value of knowing”— and as a result; 2) improving adher-
ence and thus health outcomes for treated patients; and 3)
raising overall uptake and utilization at a population level [7].
Annemans et al. [8] very effectively explain, however, how
adding a PM test or sequence of tests before the clinical treat-
ment pathway begins creates some new measurement chal-
lenges for traditional CEA. For example, where will we get the
data on the clinical and economic consequences for false-
negative and false-positives? Could they even be identiﬁed in
most commonly used trial designs? It is hoped that their
numbers will be small, yet this makes the measurement of
consequences less accurate.Annemans et al. also allude to the “value of knowing,” by
placing a “special emphasis on process utility.” Information is
important. As they put it: “even if a test result will not lead to
changing treatment, the actual value of receiving the communi-
cation about the results and the associated advice cannot be
ignored.” Payne and Annemans [9] note that there is evidence to
support the “added value from information” for clinicians and
patients. Annemans et al. note that contingent valuation
approaches have been used to measure and value the beneﬁt of
knowing. One example of this is Neumann et al. [10]. Interest-
ingly, they suggest the relevance of “capability” theory and
measurement as a research route to explore. They also point
out that “a testing strategy does not necessarily lead to more
QALYs.” In other words, the effect of testing might be to restrict
use to a subgroup, reducing the absolute quality-adjusted life-
year gains from treatment. This is because although targeting
may be cost-effective, it may mean that some patients for whom
the drug would have been effective do not receive treatment. This
could be because some of the “nonresponders” would actually
respond to some degree, and in addition there may be some false
negatives, patients misclassiﬁed as nonresponders by the test.
Thus, efﬁciency increases but some quality-adjusted life-years
are lost. Ex post targeting, where it explicitly involves no longer
treating some existing patients, can be seen in this context as a
form of disinvestment [11].
Evidence Gaps: The Need for Coverage with Evidence
Development and Performance-Based Risk-Sharing
Arrangements
Another factor hindering the development and adoption of PM is
that the current regulatory and reimbursement systems are not
leading to sufﬁcient evidence as to the value of identifying and
treating only those predicted to be “responders.” Willke et al. [12]
frame the PM stratiﬁcation strategy in terms of “heterogeneity of
treatment effect (HTE).” In other words, different subgroups
respond differently and PM research seeks to identify and study
this variation systematically. It is, however, often difﬁcult to
explore this preapproval. They speculate that manufacturers are
reluctant to limit market size and (potentially) increase the
complexity of trials by looking for HTEs preapproval even though
development costs could fall if a genetic response is identiﬁed
“early enough to reduce trial sizes and increase the probability of
success during Phase 3.” However, they also note that “over 50%
of manufacturers have incorporated pharmacogenomics or phar-
macogenetic diagnostics into their clinical development pro-
grammes,” suggesting that companies are exploring this option.
This is because, as Frueh [13] notes, “drug-test co-development . . .
poses the least challenge with respect to demonstrating the
effectiveness of a personalised medicine approach”, and as
Danzon and Towse [14] noted, “drug producers will have incen-
tives to do this ... as part of the drug development process rather
than wait for others to do it after the drugs reach the market.”
The relatively slow evolution of the science, however, means
that this may continue to be the exception rather than the rule.
Oncology and orphan diseases are areas where the science has
advanced most, and a proactive approach to stratiﬁcation to
identify HTE is likely to make sense. It does not, however, make
economic sense for companies to routinely invest in extensive
HTE analysis preapproval in many other disease areas unless
they have a very strong prior view about how to stratify the trial
population. We agree with the central point of Willke et al. [12]
that, for the time being, most HTE data are going to be collected
postapproval, and with their argument for using “risk-sharing
agreements and coverage-with-evidence development agree-
ments . . . to incentivise evidence generation and utilisation
of HTE.”
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to the concept of personalised medicine.” They argue that it will
become increasingly inappropriate to “assume perfect uptake of
tests and use in terms of prescribing practice.” How patients are
managed in practice is important. Again, postapproval data
collection will be key. They support the Willke et al. view that
collaboration between stakeholders will be needed to increase
the efﬁciency of evidence collection. Risk-sharing agreements
and coverage-with-evidence development agreements provide
incentives for such collaborative working.
Incentives for Evidence Generation
Frueh [13] notes that “tests developed after the drug has reached
the market” can be difﬁcult to introduce into clinical practice
with “slow uptake . . . in situations where the performance of the
test was less clear, differences in outcomes harder to detect, and/
or the information derived from the test more difﬁcult to trans-
late into precise clinical actions.” He contrasts the slow uptake of
CYP2C19 testing for clopidogrel with the rapid adoption of HLA-
B*5701 testing for abacavir. Where large studies are needed with
long follow-up periods, “it is difﬁcult or even impossible to turn
the development cost of such tests into proﬁts given the rates at
which such tests are usually reimbursed.” As we have pointed
out elsewhere [15], unless drug companies have an incentive to
collect evidence (as in the case of abacavir) or a payer has an
incentive because the test can be cost saving, uptake for the test
will be poor. Frueh highlights “genetics for generics” as attractive
to payers, if it “signiﬁcantly improves the clinical utility of a
generic drug” as in the case of testing for the use of warfarin,
although Burns et al. [16] point out some of the factors that have
limited the uptake of warfarin genetic testing including lack of
test availability in rural areas, delays in the receipt of results,
limited reimbursement, and concerns about cost-effectiveness,
particularly in academic centers where patients can be well
managed by traditional means. Testing for clopidogrel, in princi-
ple, falls into the genetics for generics category as well, and a
payer study was initiated but unfortunately not completed.
The problem Frueh identiﬁes is that diagnostic companies do
not have incentives to collect evidence. Addressing this requires
looking at: 1) pricing; 2) intellectual property protection—for
example, a form of data exclusivity for clinical utility evidence;
and 3) evidentiary standards and the costs of collecting evidence.
There is a danger that high evidentiary standards in both ex ante
and ex post cases of stratiﬁcation will mean less PM research and
therefore fewer PM applications. Drug manufacturers have incen-
tives to collect evidence in some circumstances as noted above,
as do payers, although in a competitive insurer market payers
will have problems appropriating the beneﬁts of evidence gene-
ration for themselves. While it is efﬁcient ex post that the public
good aspects of evidence are shared, it reduces the likelihood of
payers being willing to fund evidence generation in the ﬁrst
place. As Towse et al. [15] argue, public funding of some PM
research will be essential.
Frueh argues that evidence standards for some tests can be
met “without evidence from a prospective trial if convincing
evidence can be obtained retrospectively.”
Institutional Arrangements to Establish the Value of a Test
Frueh argues that “clinical utility for tests that follow tests
already on the market has by deﬁnition already been established”
and therefore the “characteristics of the new test (in particular
sensitivity, speciﬁcity, and cost) determine its performance com-
pared to its predecessor and it can be judged relatively easily
whether or not the cost-beneﬁt proﬁle of the new test is superior
to the existing assay.” This is true, although it is important toachieve the right balance between the gains from piggy backing
on evidence generated by others and the reduced incentive for
originators to generate that evidence if others will use it and can
compete on price without having had the expense of collecting
the evidence. Moreover, many payers do not have in place
institutional arrangements to assess the cost-effectiveness of
tests even when evidence of clinical utility and of relative test
performance is available. As Payne and Annemans note, the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence has established
its Diagnostic Assessment Programme to focus on the cost-
effectiveness of diagnostics, while “companion diagnostics will
be directed, via a Department of Health led scoping process,
through the NICE Technology Appraisal route.” Garau et al. [17]
have argued that this is an optimal institutional structure for all
payers to introduce, combined with a willingness to pay for
diagnostic tests at prices that reﬂect value.
Reimbursement and Pricing Flexibility to Support Evidence
Generation
Prices that reﬂect value should send positive signals for invest-
ment in the development of PM and in evidence to demonstrate
its value. To promote a strategic approach to market access for
PM, Payne and Annemans synthesize a dozen recommendations
for Europe that vary from the positive (“To identify how com-
panion diagnostics are priced and/or charged for at the provider
level across Europe”) to the normative (“To align the use of HTA
for the reimbursement of companion diagnostics in line with
existing practice for medicines”). Their recommendations have
two major themes: 1) we know that both evidence requirements
and reimbursement processes for companion diagnostics are
highly variable and idiosyncratic across Europe; and 2) promoting
evidence generation in support of these tests will require both
greater harmonization to send a consistent signal to test devel-
opers and some reform of the health technology assessment
process and reimbursement rules for new medicines that could
be targeted.
This variability and inconsistency has been noted by many
analysts [18,19]. Broadly speaking, most individual member
states will consider paying for new, patented medicines on their
local perception of “value.” However, reimbursement for com-
panion tests is generally more on the basis of the expected costs
of the laboratory process. In the latter case, the implication is that
no allowance is being given for the costs of either research or
generating evidence in support of clinical utility. The standard is
at best analytic validity—the test does what it is supposed to.
Payers, however, want to know that as well as that the test will
deliver value when used in the health system. That requires
evidence of clinical utility.
There are now several examples of biomarker-based PM tests
that have set their prices on the basis of a value argument. But to
do so, it is necessary to circumvent existing procedure-based
reimbursement systems. Oncotype DX (Genomic Health) for
predicting breast cancer recurrence (at an initial price of about
$3500) could be considered the poster child in this realm. The
manufacturer of this “laboratory-developed test” (LDT) does not
sell an in vitro diagnostic (IVD) kit for decentralized distribution;
rather, all samples from around the world must be sent to its
central laboratory in the United States. The development of the
evidence base for Oncotype DX cost tens of millions of dollars
and used data from historical randomized controlled trials, and
new prospective randomized controlled trials are underway,
including trials relying on public funding. The point is that
developing a robust evidence base—as Payne and Annemans call
for—is costly, and economic incentives, including better pricing
and some public funding of evidence collection, may be needed
to generate it.
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If a companion diagnostic is launched in conjunction with
medicine, then it is the combination that produces the “value”
in terms of health gain and cost-offsets, which are the two major
drivers in most CEAs. From an economic perspective, such a
combination product is synergistic in terms of value and the
division of value between the two is essentially arbitrary [20]. The
payer, or its agency, for example, the National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence in the United Kingdom, could say that we
will pay the drug manufacturer the total value, and the manu-
facturer can work out an arrangement to pay for and supply the
associated testing.
Arguably, this would seem to be efﬁcient for a test-drug
combination that is launched in tandem. But there are several
potential problems with this “solution.” First, it does not apply to
the situation where the drug is already on the market or the test
is used for multiple drugs, that is, when it is a “standalone” test.
Second, what if the drug manufacturer has come to market with
a passable, but relatively low-quality test rather than optimize
the search for the fullest set of predictive biomarkers? We may
want a better test.
In the European Union, where the prices and reimbursement
levels for new, patented medicines are largely ﬁxed at launch for
the remainder of a product’s patent life, there is clearly a strong
ﬁnancial disincentive for the drug manufacturer to discover and
develop such a PM test postlaunch. We argue that ﬂexible drug
prices are needed to deal with this situation [7]. The Pharma-
ceutical Price Regulation Scheme in the United Kingdom, in
principle, allows for such ﬂexibility, but it has not been applied
in practice, partly because of expected implementation
difﬁculties.
Garrison and Austin [20] and, more recently and in more
detail, Garrison and Towse [7], attempt to make the case for
ﬂexible and value-based pricing of both PMs and their accom-
panying test. Still, the question remains how to divide the total
value created, for example, in a post–drug launch setting. We
want to incentivize test developers to bring better tests to the
market. Garrison and Towse consider an ex post “standalone”
test and argue that we could reward the drug company for the
health gains in the responders, that is, for the mechanism of
action that they have discovered and developed, and reward the
test developers for the value of avoiding adverse drug events that
create health losses and costs, as well as any premium that might
exist for the “value of knowing” due to the reduction of uncer-
tainty. They recognize that “this split is arbitrary in a static sense,
but it can be argued that it reinforces dynamic efﬁciency by
considering the relative size of the investments needed to
develop a drug versus a diagnostic.” Clearly, this issue needs
further analysis and testing, and vetting with stakeholders. But it
is important to emphasize the need to reward both drug and test
manufacturers for greater evidence of value to encourage innova-
tion. It emphasizes the importance of dynamic efﬁciency, as
opposed to a short-term static efﬁciency perspective that is often
more about minimizing costs.
Intellectual Property Rights and Data Exclusivity
Promoting a robust evidence base may also require reforms to
intellectual property rights to help to manage the market com-
petition, as has been done recently for biosimilars in the United
States. Market competition among PM tests is already being seen:
Oncotype DX now faces several biomarker-based test competitors
that raise fascinating and as yet unaddressed questions about
market dynamics and efﬁcient competition as well as trial design
and especially how to conduct indirect comparisons among
them. There are also incentive issues around the IVD kits versus
“homebrews” (called in-house tests [IHTs] in the United Kingdomand LDTs in the United States). IVD kits require marketing
authorization from regulatory authorities, and can be subject to
some evidence requirements. IHTs/LDTs have some quality
regulation, but evidentiary requirements are much less.
By analogy with drugs, an IHT/LDT might be seen as the
“generic version” of an approved IVD. Branded medicines have
patent and market/data exclusivity that allow generic entry only
after a period of time (and biologicals were granted longer market
exclusivity protection). The situation, however, is different for
IHT/LDTs in that they need not be exact copies of IVD kits:
additional or different biomarkers may be used to predict the
responding group, and they can enter the market on the basis of
association data. Although Frueh rightly points out the beneﬁts of
follow-on tests entering the market, this tends to undermine the
incentives for the generation of data needed for companion
diagnostics. Economic analyses of breakeven returns for bio-
logicals [21] were clearly inﬂuential in setting the data exclusivity
period for biosimilars. Similar analyses and protection for PM
tests may be warranted.Conclusions: Economic Incentives for Evidence
Generation—Implications for Reform and Research
Promoting an efﬁcient path to PM is going to require appropriate
incentives for evidence generation so that cost-effective techno-
logies can demonstrate their value to patients and to the health
care system, and receive a return commensurate with that value.
As the authors of the articles in this volume have identiﬁed, this
will include the following:1. a greater willingness on the part of payers to accept prices
that reﬂect value. This will involve a need for price ﬂexibility
for drugs as evidence of their value for different groups of
patients emerges with evidence of HTE over time, and the
need for value-based rather than cost-based pricing for
diagnostics;2. consideration of some form of intellectual property protection
(e.g., data exclusivity) for diagnostics to cover evidence of clinical
utility, thus enabling diagnostic companies to obtain a sufﬁcient
return on investment in evidence generation and ensure that
there are incentives to bring higher quality tests to the market;3. realistic expectations around the standards for evidence. This
involves the use of coverage-with-evidence development
and real-world evidence collection for both drugs and
diagnostics; and4. public investment to complement the efforts of payers and
manufacturers, recognizing the limitations on the incentives
for both to invest in evidence collection on all the questions
that matter.
In conclusion, incentives matter, and the health promise of cost-
effective PM is large. We need to ensure that the pricing, evidence,
and intellectual property environment support those tackling the
scientiﬁc challenges. This means building andmaintaining a balance
among: 1) realistic thresholds for evidence and the need for payers
to have conﬁdence in the clinical utility of the drugs and tests they
use; 2) payment for value, with prices that ensure cost-effectiveness
for health systems; and 3) levels of intellectual property protection
for evidence generation that provide a return for those ﬁnancing
research and development, while encouraging competition to pro-
duce both better and more efﬁcient tests. The articles in this volume
are a useful step toward creating the right policy balance and so
moving forward the opportunity for patients to beneﬁt from PM.
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